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THE REFUSE ACT OF 1899: NEW TASKS
FOR AN OLD LAW
In 1888 the Supreme Court held that there was no federal com-
mon law prohibiting obstructions in the navigable waters of the United
States.1 In response to this decision Congress passed a series of laws
which were later reenacted as the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.2
Section 13 of that act, which prohibits discharges of refuse into navi-
gable waters without a permit, is known as the Refuse Act.3  Although
it is more than 70 years old the Refuse Act is proving to be an effective
weapon in the recently accelerated fight against water pollution.
The current need for full utilization of the Refuse Act is demon-
strated by the inadequacy of other water pollution control devices-
the private action and federal water pollution control statutes. Irrefut-
able evidence of their inadequacy is in every polluted stream or river
that passes through any significant concentration of people and in every
lake into which they flow.
I. Contemporary Abatement Devices
A. Inadequacy of Private Remedies
1. Nuisance Actions
Private citizens seeking remedies for water pollution have few
feasible common law actions. Nuisance is the theory normally relied
on,4 but the restrictiveness of its basic principles has made this action
ineffective in most water pollution cases.5 If the nuisance is public, re-
dress may normally be sought only by a public official.6 Private ac-
tions may be maintained for public nuisance only if the plaintiff can
show special injuries,7 and even if the nuisance is private only those per-
1. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888).
2. Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). An ex-
tensive legislative history is presented in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362
U.S. 482 (1960).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
4. ENVIRONMENTAL LAw HANDBOOK § 7.33 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed., 1970)
[hereinafter referred to as HANDBOOK]. Nuisances are either public or private. A
public nuisance is "an act or omission 'which obstructs or causes inconvenience or
damage to the public in exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects."'
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 89, at 605 (3d ed. 1964). "The
essence of a private nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of land."
Id. § 90, at 611.
5. See text accompanying notes 6-9 infra.
6. Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 734, 739
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Private Remedies].
7. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3493; HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 7.33.
782
sons whose property rights have been invaded can bring the action.8
These principles limit the feasibility of nuisance actions to cases where
the pollutants emanate from a single source, or where the plaintiff can
prove that a specific defendant's pollutants caused the damage.'
Since the continuing nature of most water pollution makes injunc-
tive relief the preferred remedy, nuisahce actions are ill-suited to abate a
pollution problem.10 If an injunction is sought in a nuisance action
the normal defense is the doctrine of "comparative injury," a balancing
test which weighs the damage to the plaintiff if the pollution continues
against the cost to the defendant in abating the pollution." Since the
economic and social costs of abatement are usually significantly greater
than the plaintiff's damages, the equitable injunctive relief is often de-
nied.'2 Furthermore, some states expressly deny injunctive relief in
nuisance actions without regard to the comparative injury test,' 3 thereby
precluding the remedy in every case.
2. Standing
Private actions are additionally disadvantaged by the problems re-
suiting from the plaintiff's lack of standing to sue. Traditionally, the
courts have granted standing to landowners in water pollution abate-
ment actions under the riparian rights theory.' 4  Riparian rights, how-
ever, are only recognized in landowners whose property fronts upon
the watercourse.' 5 A private citizen not within that class will not have
standing to sue under this theory until riparian rights are extended to
the general public.' 6
The problem of plaintiff's standing is not limited to the enforce-
ment of riparian rights, but exists wherever plaintiff cannot show a
specific injury. The most recent Supreme Court examination of the
requirements for standing was in Association of Data Processing Service
Organiztion, Inc. v. Camp.' 7  The Court developed in Camp a two-
step test requiring the plaintiff to allege "injury in fact, economic or
otherwise"'8 and to demonstrate that "the interest sought to be pro-
tected. . . is arguably within one of the interests to be protected by the
8. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 90, at 611.
9. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 6.20.
10. Private Remedies, supra note 6, at 747.
11. Id. at 748.
12. Id.
13. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 731a, which provides that no injunction shall issue
against a private nuisance in industrially zoned areas.
14. See Private Remedies, supra note 6, at 735.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 738.
17. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
18. Id. at 152.
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statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'19 Since the plaintiffs
in environmental suits are normally conservation organizations which
suffer no specific harm from the defendants' activities, defendants usu-
ally raise as a defense the plaintiffs' lack of standing to sue.2"
The defense, while formidable, is not insurmountable. Despite
the lack of specific injury to the typical conservation organization, some
courts have recently granted standing to these groups.2 In Citizens
Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe22 the court found that en-
vironmental organizations had standing to seek review of an Army
Corps of Engineers' permit for construction of an expressway on filled
land in the Hudson river. The court reasoned that plaintiffs, by virtue
of their long and active interest in environmental activities, were ag-
grieved parties under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act23
and therefore entitled to judicial review of the Corps' action. 4
The holding in Citizens Committee, however, is not accepted in
all jurisdictions. In Sierra Club v. Hickel2' the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals denied the Sierra Club standing to contest the granting of a
permit to Walt Disney Enterprises to build the Mineral King Ski Resort
in the Sequoia National Game Refuge. In reaching its conclusion the
court distinguished Citizens Committee and similar cases with little dis-
cussion. Until the Supreme Court rules specifically on the standing of
conservationist organizations, the problem of standing will continue to
be a major impediment to private actions for pollution control.
B. Statutory Environment Protection
Federal legislation has been equally ineffective in water pollution
abatement efforts. The only comprehensive statutory scheme enacted
by Congress to deal with water pollution is the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA) passed in 19482 Although drafted in great
detail and significantly amended in subsequent years, the act is still un-
responsive to the practicalities and exigencies of water pollution con-
19. Id. at 153.
20. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 4.10.
21. Id.
22. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970).
24. 425 F.2d at 104.
25. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S.
Nov. 5, 1970) (No. 939).
26. Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155, as .amended, Act of July 17, 1952, ch. 927, 66 Stat.
755; Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat. 498; Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat.
204; Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; Clean Water Res-
toration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246; Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 [hereinafter cited as FWPCA]. The
FWPCA is codified in usable form at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
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trol..2 7 The principal weakness of the FWPCA lies in its enforcement
procedures and inherent time delays. The act provides for a compli-
cated series of hearings and conferences; there is a minimum delay of 6
months before a hearing board can issue an abatement order,28 and the
order cannot compel actual abatement until an additional 6 months have
elapsed. 9 Only after the order takes effect and the defendant has failed
to comply can an enforcement action be brought by the Justice Depart-
ment. 0 The records of the few enforcement conferences which have
been called demonstrate that, in practice, several years may elapse be-
fore an order is even promulgated. 3'
The deficiency of the FWPCA's enforcement procedure is further
compounded by the absence of any penalty provisions to induce pollut-
ers voluntarily to begin abatement activities before a final abatement
order is issued. In addition, the act fails to provide any discharge
standards for individual polluters; nor does it provide for the establish-
ment of such standards. The only standards provided for are ambient
standards which set maximum pollutant concentrations in receiving
bodies of water.32  Consequently, there are no restrictions on the pol-
lutants released in the individual polluter's effluent stream. This omis-
sion permits multiple polluters to continue discharging effluents while
the cumulative effect of their discharges reduces the quality of the re-
ceiving body of water below the standards set by the act.33
H. Provisions of the Refuse Act
The Refuse Act provides solutions to a number of the difficulties
encountered in endeavors to abate water pollution through contempor-
ary theories. In pertinent part, the act provides:
It shall not be unlawful to [discharge from any craft or shore in-
stallation] any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever
other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing there-
from in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States
; and it shall not be unlawful to [allow material to be washed
from a bank] whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or ob-
structed. .... 34
27. A leading authority has concluded that "Etihe development of [the FWPCA]
in the past twenty-two years has been a story of delayed and inadequate response to
the increasing problems of water pollution." Barry, The Evolution of the Enforce-
mnent Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.: A Study of the Difficulty
in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1103, 1104 (1970).
28. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 7.18.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 1 BNA ENV. REP. Federal Laws 41:5201-10 (1970).
32. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 7.20.
33. Barry, supra note 27, at 1122.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
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A. Judicial Construction
Inquiry into construction of the act has centered on four terms:
(1) refuse, (2) navigable waters, (3) discharges from sewers and (4)
obstruction of navigation. The applicability of the act is determined by
the scope given to "refuse" and "navigable water" under the act. On
the other hand, the exception from the act of refuse "flowing from streets
and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state" limits its applica-
bility; the act is further limited by the clause requiring that "navigation
shall or may be impeded or obstructed" by the discharged refuse.
The general attitude of the courts in interpreting the Refuse Act
has been extremely favorable. For example, in United States v. Repub-
lic Steel Corp.35 the defendant had discharged suspended solids which
settled out in the Calumet river in alleged violation of the Refuse Act
and section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which forbids
obstructions in navigable waters. In finding a violation of both sections
the Court stated:
We read the 1899 Act charitably in light of the purpose to be
served. The philosophy of the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes
. . . that "A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure," for-
bids a narrow, cramped reading. . . of [the Refuse Act].36
Because the terms "navigable water" and "refuse" have been given
the broadest possible definitions,17 the Refuse Act can be invoked in
situations involving almost any discharge into any body of water. A
compilation of the interpretations given in the leading cases defines
"navigable waters" as
waterways which either in their natural or improved condition
are used, or can be used, for floating light boats or logs, even
though the waterway may be obstructed by falls, rapids, sand
bars, currants etc., and even though the waterway has not
been used for navigation for many years. 38
From this all-inclusive definition it is clear that virtually any waters cap-
able of use for significant discharge of refuse will fall within the defini-
tion of navigable waters and thus, within the scope of the Refuse Act.
The current definition of "refuse" is premised on the United
States v. Ballard Oil Co.39 interpretation. In Ballard the defendant
was charged with violation of the Refuse Act when oil was allowed to
overfill a storage tank and flow into a river through a waste pipe. In
35. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
36. Id. at 491.
37. See text accompanying footnotes 38-44 infra.
38. HOUSE COMM. ON GOv'T OPERATIONS, OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS: How
THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIR DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION,
TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 n.23 [hereinafter
cited as TwENTY-FRST REPORT].
39. 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952).
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finding that the oil was refuse within the meaning of the Refuse Act,
the court held that" 'refuse' . . is satisfied by anything which has be-
come waste, however useful it may earlier have been."4
The Supreme Court considerably expanded the Ballard definition
in United States v. Standard Oil Co.41  In that case the defendant was
charged with spilling commercially valuable aviation gasoline into a
navigable river in violation of the Refuse Act. The federal district
court had concluded that this discharge was not within the Refuse Act
because the oil was valuable and therefore not waste. The Supreme
Court, however, noted the nation's concern over increasing pollution
and reversed the district court, providing: "The word 'refuse' includes
all foreign substances and pollutants. .. 42
The broadness of this definition was demonstrated in a recent fed-
eral court case in Florida, United States v. Florida Power & Light Co.4"
In that case the United States filed an action under the Refuse Act to
restrain the defendant from continuing to discharge pure but heated
water into Biscayne Bay. Although the court denied a motion for a
preliminary injunction because of an insufficient showing of irrepar-
able harm, it did not question that the discharge of heated water was
refuse within the meaning of the Refuse Act. If this "thermal pollu-
tion" is within the meaning of "refuse," most industrial discharges
should fall within the scope of the act.44
In furthering its apparent intent to make the Refuse Act broadly
applicable, the judiciary has narrowly construed the two limiting
clauses of the act. In United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,45 the ap-
pellate court had construed the exception clause liberally, in favor of
the defendant, to hold that suspended solids in liquid waste flowing
from the defendant's private sewer constituted refuse "flowing from
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state." In reject-
ing this construction the Supreme Court stated:
Refuse flowing from "sewers" in a "liquid state" means to us
"sewage". . . . The fact that discharges from streets and
sewers may contain some articles in suspension that settle out
and potentially impair navigability is no reason for us to en-
large the group to include these industrial discharges. 46
The practical effect of this holding is to apply the exception clause only
40. Id. at 371.
41. 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
42. Id. at 230.
43. 311 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
44. Thermal pollution is the discharge of otherwise harmless water into a body
of cooler water to such a degree that the ecology of the receiving body is adversely af-
fected. Note, Thermal Pollution: The Electrical Utility Industry and Section 21(b) of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 22 HAsTINGs L.J. 685 (1970).
45. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
46. Id. at 490-91.
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to discharges from municipal sewers47 and to deny the exception to
industrial effluence, regardless of the manner of discharge.
The clause requiring that a discharge affect the navigability of a
waterway has also been strictly construed. Ballard specifically held
that "whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed" ap-
plies only to the second Refuse Act prohibition against depositing ref-
use on banks abutting navigable waters, and not to the first prohibition
of discharging refuse directly into navigable waters. The logical con-
clusion is that refuse discharged directly "into any navigable water"
need not obstruct navigation to be in violation of the Refuse Act; the
discharge per se is a violation.48
B. Discharge Permits
The prohibition against discharging refuse into navigable waters is
not absolute. The Refuse Act provides that the Corps of Engineers
may permit the deposit of [refuse] in navigable waters, within
limits to be defined and under conditions to be prescribed by
[the Secretary of the Army] and whenever any permit is so granted
the conditions thereof shall be strictly complied with, and any vio-
lation thereof shall be unlawful. 49
Historically this provision of the Refuse Act has been virtually ig-
nored by the Corps of Engineers;5" only 266 permits under the Ref-
use Act were in effect in August 1970.51 Since all discharges of refuse
into navigable waters without a permit are in violation of the Refuse Act,
the granting of permits will be of increasing significance as public
awareness of environmental problems expands to demand tighter con-
trol over the nation's waterways. 52  A congressional committee stud-
ying the water pollution problem has specifically recommended that
"the Corps of Engineers . . .vigorously enforce the Refuse Act" and
request actions "against all persons whose discharges or deposits . . .
violate the Refuse Act. .... -53
47. Interview with V.F. Smith, Chief Counsel, Corps of Engineers, Northern
District of California, in San Francisco, Sept. 22, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Interview].
48. The Oregon Supreme Court has also held specifically that refuse need not
obstruct navigation to be in violation ot the Refuse Act. Myrtle Point Transp., Co. v.
Port of Coquille River, 86 Ore. 311, 168 P. 625 (1917).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
50. Not until its most recent regulations did the Corps of Engineers call for a
permit for deposit of refuse under the Refuse Act. Proposed Corps of Engineers Dis-
charge Regulations, 35 Fed. Reg. 20,005 (1970). Contrast and compare Army Reg.
ER 1145-2-303 (change 5) (Apr. 23, 1970) which does not cite the Refuse Act as
authority for the issuance of permits.
51. CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, CONSERVATION FOUNDATION LETTER, Aug. 1970,
at 2.
52. The Corps has recently required 50 mercury dischargers to obtain Refuse
Act permits. 1 BNA ENV. REP. Current Developments 781 (1970).
53. TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, supra note 38, at 16-17.
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Perhaps in response to this public and congressional pressure the
President has announced that the permit provisions of the Refuse Act
will be put to use.54 Under the Executive Order issued December 23,
1970, all companies discharging wastes into navigable waters will be
required to submit an application for a permit under the Refuse Act by
July 1, 1971.1r The order will affect about 40,000 current indus-
trial facilities and approximately 1,000 new plants built each year."
Since the permit procedure provides opportunities for the envi-
ronmentalist to make his views known, a thorough understanding of
the procedure is beneficial. Prior to applying to the Corps of Engi-
neers for a discharge permit, the applicant must obtain a certification
from the appropriate state authorities that, with reasonable assurance,
the proposed discharge will comply with the applicable state water
quality standards.5 7  After obtaining state approval, the applicant
must file for the discharge permit in accordance with the instructions in
the pamphlet entitled "Permits for Work in Navigable Waters."58
The pamphlet requires information pertaining to the location, con-
struction and purpose of the project. In addition, applicants must fur-
nish information pertaining to "chemical content, water temperature
differentials, toxins, sewage, amount and frequency of discharge and
the type and quantity of solids involved ... " as well as plans for pol-
lution abatement."
When the application is received by the Corps of Engineers,
a public notice concerning the permit application will be sent to
all parties known or believed to be interested in the application,
such as ... local conservation organizations. Public notice is
mandatory except in those cases when it appears that the pro-
posed work would have no significant impact on environment
values ....
If the permit is protested, the Corps makes the protest and its
proponents known to the applicant so a compromise may be worked
out between the parties. If an agreement is reached the permit will is-
sue conditioned on the terms of the agreement. If no agreement is
reached, the application is sent to the Chief of Engineers in Washing-
54. Executive Order No. 11,574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,627 (1970).
55. 1 BNA ENV. REP. Current Developments 910 (1971).
56. Id.
57. This is required by the FWPCA § 21(b)(1); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1171(b)(1)
(1970).
58. CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PERMITS FOR WORK IN NAVIGABLE
WATERS, AGO 20039A. Army Reg. ER 1145-2-303, para. 3(a) (change 5) (Apr. 23,
1970), requires compliance with the instructions in the pamphlet.
59. Army Reg. ER 1145-2-303, para. 3(c) (change 5) (Apr. 23, 1970). These
provisions were added at the request of the Conservation and Natural Resources Subcom-
mittee of the House of Representatives. TwENrv-FmsTr REPORT, supra note 38, at 14.
60. Army Reg. ER 1145-2-303, para. 4(a) (change 5) (Apr. 23, 1970).
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ton, who makes the final decision on issuance of a permit. 1
Any individual or organization will, upon request, be notified by
the Corps of all permit applications, and be given an opportunity to
challenge the granting of discharge permits and to reach a compromise
with the applicants. Even if no agreement is reached, the protests are
included in the applicant's record and forwarded to Washington for
consideration. 2 The permit procedure, therefore, affords interested
members of the public with an early opportunity to be heard on the
relative merits of a proposed project having environmental ramifica-
tions. In this respect it differs markedly from the administrative pro-
cedures of other regulatory agencies,6 3 a fact which significantly en-
hances its value to conservation organizations.
HI. Enforcement
The Refuse Act provides that it shall be unlawful either to dis-
charge refuse without a permit or to violate the conditions of a per-
mit.64 Unlawful acts of either type can result in enforcement pro-
ceedings brought by the Justice Department (either at the request of
the Corps of Engineers or on its own volition) 5 or in informer ac-
tions brought by private citizens. 6 The provisions for enforcement
of the Refuse Act are found in sections 16 and 17 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899. Section 16 provides:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate [the Refuse
Act] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less than
$500, or by imprisonment . . . for not less than thirty days
nor more than one year, or by both such fine or imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court, one-half of said fine to be paid to the
person or persons giving information which shall lead to convic-
tion."
Section 17 expressly confers on the Justice Department authority to
61. Before granting any permit which might have a significant effect on the en-
vironment, the Corps is required by the National Environmental Policy Act to make a
five-point statement detailing the environmental impact of the alternatives to the pro-
posed project. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (Supp. V, 1970).
62. An earlier opportunity will be provided if the state provides for hearings
in its certification procedure. California certifies its requests for federal permits
through the normal discharge permit procedure. Thus a hearing may be had at either
the regional or state board level. Administrative Procedures of the State Water Re-
sources Control Board, published Sept. 23, 1970.
63. For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act has serious deficiencies
in its provisions for public hearings which are made entirely discretionary. See
FWPCA § 21(b)(1); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1177(b)(1) (1970).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
65. See text accompanying notes 70-98 infra.
66. Qui tam actions are discussed in the text accompanying notes 109-43 infra.
67. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
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enforce the act:
The Department of Justice shall conduct the legal proceed-
ings necessary to enforce the provisions of [the Refuse Act]
* . . ;and it shall be the duty of United States attorneys to
vigorously prosecute all offenders against the same whenever
requested to do so by the Secretary of the Army68 or by any
of the officials hereinafter designated .... 19
A. Propriety of Enforcement
Although the Justice Department is clearly authorized to "con-
duct the legal proceedings necessary to enforce" the Refuse Act, it has
been reluctant to do so. Instead, its announced policy is to avoid us-
ig the Refuse Act as a pollution abatement statute in competition with
the FWPCA.7 ° The Justice Department apparently finds a conflict
between the two statutes because both are primarily directed towards
the abatement of continuing discharges of effluents, the principal
source of water pollution. Finding that "it is precisely this type of dis-
charge that the Congress created the Federal Water Quality Adminis-
tration [under the FWPCA] to decrease or eliminate," the Justice
Department has stated that it will defer to the administration actions to
abate such discharges. 71
The Justice Department predicated its deference to the Federal
Water Quality Administration on the policy statement of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act: 72 The act's purpose is "to establish a
national policy for prevention, control, and abatement of water pollu-
tion."17  In light of other, more specific FWPCA provisions, however,
it is doubtful that the department's position is justified. Section 24 of
68. In practice the Corps of Engineers administers the Rivers and Harbors Act.
Interview, supra note 47. Unless otherwise indicated, information regarding the Corps
procedures in administrating the Rivers and Harbors Act was obtained from the Inter-
view.
69. 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964). The act names the agents in charge of river and
harbor improvements, the engineers and inspectors employed by them, customs col-
lectors and other revenue officers.
70. Jusnicn DEP'T, GUIDELINES FOR LTGATION UNDER THE REFUSE Acr, II.!
(June 15, 1970), reprinted in 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Developments 288 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as GumELiNEs]. It should be noted at the start of this discussion
that the Executive Order discussed in text accompanying notes 54-56 supra does not an-
nounce a change in administration enforcement policies but only requires that dis-
chargers obtain the permit provided for in the Refuse Act.
71. GUIDELINES at 111. The Federal Water Quality Administration has been
abolished by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 6(a)(1), in [19701 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEwS 2996. All of its functions have been transferred to the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. § 2(a)(1). Since only the ad-
ministration of the FWPCA has changed, the Justice Department's position is not af-
fected.
72. GUIDELINES at 11.1.
73. FWPCA § l(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1151(a) (1970).
REFUSE ACT OF 1899Februar 19711
the FWPCA, for example, states that:
This act shall not be construed as (1) superseding or limit-
ing the functions, under any other law ...of any other officer
or agency of the United States, relating to water pollution or
(2) affecting or impairing the provisions of sections 13 through 17
of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. ... 4
This section was not in any way altered by the 1970 amendments to
the FWPCA.75 It is apparent, thererfore, that Congress intended the
Refuse Act to remain in full force, and that the Justice Department
has unjustifiedly abdicated its authority.
The recent case of United States v. Interlake Steel Corp."6 also
reached the conclusion that the Refuse Act was intended to remain in
full force. The defendant in Interlake was indicted for discharging
iron particles and oily substances into a navigable river in violation of
the Refuse Act. One theory offered by the defendant in support of his
motion to dismiss was that his discharges were within standards set un-
der the FWPCA which, he claimed, had superseded the Refuse Act.
In denying the motion the court rejected the defendant's contention,
holding that the FWPCA "cannot be held to supersede or emasculate
the prohibitions of the Rivers and Harbors Act," and that standards
adopted under the FWPCA could not condone discharges prohibited
by the Refuse Act.77
In addition to retaining the specific provisions of section 24, the
recent amendments to the FWPCA added a new procedure specifically
relating to the Refuse Act. Section 21(b) (1) of the FWPCA,
added in 1970, requires applicants for a federal permit "which may
result in any discharge into the navigable waters of the United States"
to obtain a statement from the responsible state or interstate agency
certifying that the proposed discharge "will not violate applicable wa-
ter quality standards.""8  Since Refuse Act permits are federal per-
mits, this amendment actually expands the role of the Refuse Act by
bringing the states within the scope of the permit procedures.
Both of these FWPCA sections refute the Justice Department's
position that the Refuse Act should not be enforced in competition
with the FWPCA. Since the Refuse Act is an independent and viable
tool for water pollution control, there is no compelling reason why the
Justice Department should not actively prosecute Refuse Act viola-
tions of all types.
74. Id. § 24, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1174.
75. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91
(codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151-75 (1970) ).
76. 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
77. Id. at 916.
78. FWPCA § 21(b)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1171(b)(1) (1970).
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B. Mandatory Enforcement by the Justice Department
Contrary to the contention of the Justice Department-that its en-
forcement function has been preempted by the Federal Water Quality
Administration (now the Environmental Protection Agency)-section
17 of the Rivers and Harbors Act makes enforcement of the Refuse
Act by the Department of Justice a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty
when enforcement is requested by the Secretary of the Army. The
Secretary of the Army performs this function through the Corps of En-
gineers. 79
The role of the Corps of Engineers is to receive information and
to request the Department of Justice to prosecute violators.80 The
Corps may receive information on alleged violations from any source,
and information is routinely received both from the Coast Guard and
from state agencies responsible for water quality protection., On
receipt of information of an alleged violation, the Corps determines
whether it has sufficient evidence to support a cause of action. Before
requesting the Department of Justice to institute an action, the Corps
also ascertains whether the alleged unlawful discharge is exempt from
prosecution under the Justice Department Guidelines.82  If, in the
opinion of the Corps of Engineers, the evidence is adequate and none
of the Justice Department exemptions apply, the Corps will recom-
mend to the Justice Department that a prosecution be instituted.
When the Corps of Engineers requests a prosecution, "it shall be
the duty of the United States attorneys to vigorously prosecute. . . .
The mandatory nature of this charge was referred to in South Carolina
ex rel. Maybank v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.", At issue in
that case was the proper interpretation of a section of the Rivers and
Harbors Act providing that removal of an obstruction "may be" en-
forced by injunction and that proceedings to that effect "may be" in-
stituted by the Attorney General. 5  Although the court held that the
use of "may be" evidenced an intent to create a discretionary and not
a mandatory duty,8 6 there was dicta to the effect that a mandatory re-
quirement is created by the use of "shall be" as those words are used
79. See note 68 & accompanying text supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 49-63 supra.
81. Interview, supra note 47. For instance, in California information is rou-
tinely sent by the Fish and Game Department.
82. These categories include cases "where the defendant is or has been a party to
an administrative proceeding which has been or is being conducted by the Federal Wa-
ter Quality Administration" and where the defendant's unlawful activity "is the sub-
ject of abatement litigation or criminal prosecution initiated by a State, County, mu-
nicipality or other political subdivision." GUimDLEnS, supra note 70, at fII.3-5.
83. 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
84. 41 F. Supp. 111 (E.D.S.C. 1941).
85. The section being construed was 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1964).
86. 41 F. Supp. at 118-19.
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in section 17.87 Although dicta in the Maybank case, the mandatory
nature of "shall be" as applied to an official duty is supported by non-
Rivers and Harbors Act cases.88
C. Discretionary Enforcement on the Department's Own Volition
The Justice Department need not wait for the Corps of Engineers
or other officials named in section 17 to request prosecutions under
the Refuse Act. Section 17 has been construed to allow the Justice
Department to proceed both at the request of others and on its own vo-
lition.89
One of the defenses interposed by the defendant in United States
v. Interlake Steel Corp.9" was that the prosecution was undertaken at
the request of the Coast Guard rather than one of the entities named
in section 17.91  In rejecting this defense the court stated that "en-
forceability of the act clearly should not rest upon the fortuity of which
particular federal agency, with jurisdiction over the navigable waters
of the United States, detects a violation and reports it to the United
States attorney."92 In reaching this decision the court relied on the
broader language of United States v. Burns.93 In Burns the charge of
obstructing navigable waters was based on the predecessor statute to
section 17.94 Before granting the motion to quash for defects in the
indictment, the court found that the action was not precluded because
the district attorney had acted on his own volition. The court's con-
clusion was that despite the specified right of others to request a prose-
cution, the right of the federal prosecution officer "to initiate proceed-
ings in the manner usual to criminal cases, is not affected, and remains
as heretofore." 95
The Justice Department concedes that it has the authority to ini-
tiate actions under the Refuse Act if its enforcement functions are not
preempted by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.96 Its Guide-
lines for Litigation Under the Refuse Act authorizes a United States
attorney to institute criminal or civil actions where he is presented with
evidence from the Corps of Engineers or "is otherwise satisfied that he
87. Id. at 118.
88. United States v. Hughes, 414 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1969); Petition of
Shafer, 347 Pa. 130, 134, 31 A.2d 537, 540 (1943).
89. See text accompanying notes 90-98 infra.
90. 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
91. If the Corps of Engineers had requested the prosecution on the Coast
Guard's information, this defense could not have been raised. See text accompany-
ing notes 79-88 supra.
92. 297 F. Supp. at 914.
93. 54 F. 351 (C.C.W. Va. 1893).
94. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 11, 26 Stat. 455.
95. 54 F. at 355.
96. GUIDELINES, supra note 70, at II.4, 1112.A (iii).
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has adequate evidence to prove that the defendant has" violated the
Refuse Act. 7  Allowing United States attorneys to proceed on their
own volition is the sound position, supported both by the cases in point
and by the general judicial policy of charitably reading the Rivers and
Harbors Act. 8
IV. Relief Available for Violation of the Refuse Act
A. The Injunctive Remedy
Section 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 specifically
makes violation of the Refuse Act a misdemeanor and provides for a
jail sentence or fine upon conviction.99 The United States is not, how-
ever, restricted to these criminal sanctions. The courts have held that
injunctive relief will lie under section 17 in cases where other reme-
dies are inadequate.
In United States v. Republic Steel Corp., °00 the Government had
asked for an injunction against defendant's future discharges as well as
for an order requiring removal of its past deposits. Although there is
no specific provision for this type of injunctive relief in the Rivers and
Harbors Act, the five members of the majority found it within the
power of the Court to grant the relief prayed for under sections 10 and
17. In reaching this position, the Court first noted that section 17
provided "that 'the Department of Justice shall conduct the legal pro-
ceedings necessary to enforce' the provision of the [Rivers and Har-
bors] Act. . ... ,101 An injunction was found to be within the neces-
sary legal proceedings because "Congress . . .has provided enough
federal law in [section] 10 from which appropriate remedies may be
fashioned even though they rest on inferences.' 1 0 2  The four dissent-
ing justices in Republic Steel argued that section 10 did not provide
for injunctive relief and narrowly construed section 17 as limiting the
forms of relief available to those specifically provided for in the act. 03
When the issue arose again, however, the Court was much more
certain that injunctive relief was a proper remedy. Wyandotte Trans-
portation Co. v. United States' was a combination of two cases
brought under section 15 of the act, which made it unlawful to sink a
vessel in navigable waters. In one of the cases the Government asked
for an injunction to require removal of the sunken hulk, and in the
97. Id. at M.1.A.(i).
98. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
99. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
100. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
101. Id. at 491.
102. Id. at 492.
103. Id. at 493 (dissenting opinion).
104. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
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other asked for reimbursement for the costs it had expended in remov-
ing another vessel. The only enforcement provision of the Rivers and
Harbors Act which applied was section 17. The Court granted the
mandatory injunction in one case, and reimbursement in the other. In
supporting its decision, the unanimous Court stated:
[O]ur reading of the Act does not lead us to the conclusion
that Congress must have intended the statutory remedies and
procedures to be exclusive of all others. There is no indication
anywhere else-in the legislative history of the Act, in the
predecessor statutes, or in nonstatutory law-that Congress
might have intended that a party who negligently sinks a vessel
should be shielded from personal responsibility. Applying the
principles of our decision in Republic Steel, we conclude that
other remedies, including [injunctions] are available to the Govern-
ment.105
Although no case has specifically held that injunctions will lie for
Refuse Act violations, either to prohibit future discharges or, more re-
motely, to require removal of past refuse discharges, both Republic
Steel and Wyandotte provide strong support for such a conclusion. In
each of these cases the only enforcement provision of the Rivers and
Harbors Act which applied was section 17. Since section 17 also ap-
plies to the Refuse Act, the Court should encounter no difficulty in
finding injunctive relief available to the government in prosecutions for
its violation.
Further persuasive authority for allowing injunctions under the
Refuse Act can be found in the Twenty-First Report by the Committee
on Government Operations of the House of Representatives."0 6 That
report urged the Corps of Engineers to actively seek injunctions
against violators of the Refuse Act based on the Republic Steel and
Wyandotte precedents."0 7 The same interpretation of Republic Steel
and Wyandotte is made by the Justice Department. Its Guidelines
state that under those decisions injunctions "are deemed to be author-
ized by necessary implication."' °8 These conclusions are in harmony
with the mandate of the National Environmental Policy Act that stat-
utes be interpreted in accordance with sound environmental policies,
and therefore should be given great weight by the courts.
B. Qui Tam Actions
If the Corps of Engineers does not act on information provided by
a private citizen and the Justice Department cannot be persuaded to
act on its own volition," 9 the citizen will be compelled to look to
105. Id. at 200-01.
106. See note 38 supra.
107. TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, supra note 38, at 18.
108. GUIDELINES, supra note 70, at I.B.
109. Congressman H.S. Reuss (D-Wis.) filed four suits himself, explaining that
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other methods of enforcement. The language in section 16, that "one-
half of said fine. . be paid to the person or persons giving informa-
tion which shall lead to conviction," 110 strongly suggests a qui tam
action. Qui tam"' is used to describe a civil action brought by a
private citizen under a penal statute when the statute provides that
a portion of the fine, penalty or forfeiture shall go to the citizen."'
The right of the citizen to institute his own action without relying
on the government prosecutor distinguishes the qui tam statute from
a statute which reserves to a governmental entity the exclusive au-
thority to enforce the statutory requirements. Even where the stat-
ute authorizes a qui tam action on its face, the citizen may be pre-
cluded from bringing the action if the government has reserved juris-
diction to its own prosecutors.113
Statutes authorizing qui tam actions were employed in England
to compensate for inadequate governmental enforcement due to lack
of personnel or inclination." 4  Qui tam actions "have been in exist-
ence. . . in [the United States] ever since the foundation of our gov-
erinent.""5  Their value has been specifically recognized by the
courts. In United States v. Griswold,"" the Oregon Federal District
Court defended the private prosecutor's interest in a judgment obtained
under a qui tam statute against an action by the United States to re-
lease the defendant from the penalty. The court said of such statutes:
[O]ne of the least expensive and most effective means of
preventing frauds on the treasury is to make the perpetrators
of them liable to actions by private persons acting, if you
please, under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the
hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means com-
pare with the ordinary as the enterprising privateer does to
the slow-going public vessel." 7
he had informed the Justice Department of the violations earlier, but that the "Justice
Department guidelines indicate the action will not be commenced." 1 BNA ENv. REP.
Current Developments 489 (1970).
110. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
111. Qui tam is a shortened derivation of the Latin term meaning "who brings the
action as well for the king as for himself." STAFF OF CONSERVATION AND NATURAL
RESOURCES SUBCOMM. OF THE HousE COMM. ON GOv'T OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., 2D
SESs., Qui TAM ACTIONS AND THE 1899 REFUSE ACT: CITIZEN LAWSUITS AGAINST
POLLUTERS OF THE NATION'S WATERWAYS 1 (Comm. Print 1970). [hereinafter cited
as Qui TAM ACTIONS].
112. Id.
113. See cases cited in Qur TAM ACTIONS, supra note 111, at 24-26 & text accom-
panying note 138 infra.
114. Viscount Simon, 171 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1052 (1951). For a
painstakingly detailed historical development of qui tam actions see QUI TAMt ACTIONS,
note 111, supra.
115. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905).
116. 24 F. 361 (D. Ore. 1885).
117. Id. at 366.
February 1971] REFUSE ACT OF 1899
The language of section 16, although strongly suggestive of a qui
tam action, presents several obstacles to maintenance of the action.
First, the statute does not expressly provide for a qui tam action. Sec-
ondly, the statute provides that half the fine imposed be paid to the
person providing information which leads to conviction rather than to
a person who prosecutes the action. This distinction is significant be-
cause statutes construed to allow qui tam actions have usually provided
that half the penalty go to the person who prosecutes the action.""
The third problem arises because section 16 allows the court discre-
tion in imposing either a fine or imprisonment for violation of the Ref-
use Act. The alternative of imposing a prison sentence on the violator
is not found in other statutes which the courts have found will support
a qui tam action." 9  These obstacles are not insurmountable, how-
ever, and do not a fortiori preclude a qui tam action under the Refuse
Act.
A statute need not expressly confer a qui tam action in order to
support it. This conclusion has its foundation in an early Supreme
Court case recognizing the validity of a qui tam action, Adams, qui
tam, v. Woods.' That action was brought under a statute punish-
ing slave trade with other countries by forfeiture of "the sum of two
thousand dollars; one moiety thereof to the use of him or her who shall
sue for and prosecute the same." '2 The statute did not expressly
confer a qui tam action. Although the action was barred by the stat-
ute of limitations, the Court said "the statute which creates the for-
feiture does not prescribe the mode of demanding it; consequently, ei-
ther debt or information would lie."' ' 2
This treatment was interpreted in United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess,12 which involved a statute imposing criminal sanctions for de-
frauding the Government, to mean that "[s]tatutes providing for a re-
ward to informers which do not specifically either authorize or forbid
the informer to institute the action are construed to authorize him to
sue." 24  This dicta is broad enough to allow construction of section
118. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Adams,
qui tam, v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
119. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Adams,
qui tam, v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805); United States v. Stocking, 87 F. 857
(D. Mont. 1898); United States v. Griswold, 26 F. Cas. 42 (No. 15,266) (D. Ore.
1877); Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Howard, 38 Ill. 414 (1865).
120. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 341.
123. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
124. Id. at 541 n.4. An action to recover the fine and assessed damages author-
ized by the statute could be "instituted by 'any' person in behalf of the government, and
where such a qui tam action is brought, half the amount of the recovery is paid to the
person instituting the suit ...... Id. at 540-41.
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16 as authorizing qui tam actions. Since the section does not ex-
pressly authorize the informer to institute the action, but does not pro-
hibit private enforcement, the section can be construed to "authorize
him to sue." This conclusion is supported by other cases which have
used the same broad language as Marcus in. construing inexplicit stat-
utes to authorize a qui tam action.
125
If the Refuse Act is to be vigorously enforced, as recommended
by a congressional committee 26 and as intimated by the President,1
2 7
it is in the public interest that the courts not defeat qui tam actions en-
forcing the Refuse Act by distinguishing section 16 rewards to inform-
ers from rewards to those who prosecute an action. Both the Justice
Department and the Corps of Engineers lack the funds and personnel
necessary to adequately enforce the act.12 8 The burden of enforcing
the Refuse Act against innumerable industrial dischargers can only be
met if the citizen is allowed to privately enforce the criminal sanctions
of the act. Private enforcement should be permitted, provided that the
plaintiff first demonstrates to the court that the Justice Department
does not plan to act on the information made available.
Allowing private enforcement of the act through qui tam proceed-
ings will not subject the defendant to the possibility of a subsequent
misdemeanor prosecution by the Government in an attempt to obtain
the violator's imprisonment. Section 16 is clearly a criminal statute.
Violators are "guilty" of a "misdemeanor" and upon "conviction" shall
be "punished" by a fine or by "imprisonment;' 29 the statute has been
held by the United States Supreme Court to be a criminal statute. 30
The fine provided for in section 16 is in no way remedial' 3 ' as it does
125. In United States v. Stocking, 87 F. 857 (D. Mont. 1898), the court, consider-
ing a statute which provided that a penalty "shall be sued for and recovered ... one
half to the informer," stated that "[amny words of a statute which show that a part of
the penalty named therein shall be for the use of an informer will entitle him to main-
tain an action therefore if he complies with the conditions of the statute." Id. at
261. The court went further in Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Howard, 38 Ill. 414 (1865),
where the statute being interpreted provided only for a penalty of 50 dollars for each
neglect to be paid by the corporation owning the railroad, "one-half to the informer, and
the other half to the state." Id. at 417. The court found a qui tam action authorized
by implication even though another section of the act specifically provided that the
district attorney should sue for the fine. Contra, Omaha & Republican Valley Ry. v.
Hale, 45 Neb. 418 (1895), where the court found that the same language neither
expressly nor impliedly authorized an action by an informer.
126. TwENTY-FnrsT REPORT, supra note 38, at 14.
127. See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
128. Qul TAM AcTIONS, supra note 111, at 11. See note 142 infra.
129. 33 U.S.C. 411 (1964).
130. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225 (1966).
131. Cf. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943). In
Marcus, however, the statute contained two enforcement sections; one provided for fine
or imprisonment, and the other provided for a forfeiture and double damages. Id. at
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not attempt to relate the amount of the fine to damages caused either
to the Government or to a private citizen by violation of the Refuse
Act. Since the fine cannot be viewed as anything but a criminal sanc-
tion, a fine recovered in a qui tam action would subject the defendant
to jeopardy within the fifth amendment meaning and would protect
him from any further Refuse Act prosecution for the same offense.
11 2
Since a fine imposed in a qui tam action is a criminal sanction, the
question arises whether a citizen can enforce such a sanction. An af-
firmative answer to that question is supported both by the history of
qui tam actions in England, where citizens were commonly relied on
to enforce criminal statutes by qui tam proceedings,'33 and by the lan-
guage of American courts. The words of Chief Justice Marshall in
Adams, qui tam, v. Woods134 are instructive here. He stated that "[a]l-
most every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute may be recovered
by an action of debt, as well as by information."' 35
The remaining problem, that the language of the section allows
the court, in its discretion, to impose either a fine or imprisonment, is
solved by the very nature of the qui tam action. The action is brought
only to collect a portion of the fine provided for by the statute 30 and
not to obtain a sentence of imprisonment. The court, in allowing the
qui tam action on the basis of policy considerations and the informa-
tion furnished by the plaintiff that the Government does not plan to
act, would implicitly be recognizing the reluctance or inability of the
Justice Department to seek a misdemeanor prosecution resulting in the
imprisonment of the alleged violator. In effect, the court would be
exercising its discretion to impose a fine as the penalty for any viola-
tion shown to exist and waiving its discretionary authority to impose a
sentence of imprisonment. Should plaintiff prove a violation of the
act, only a fine could be assessed by the court.
In addition to the language of section 16, the effect of the provi-
sions of section 17 must be considered in determining whether qui
tam actions will lie under the Refuse Act. The first clause of section
17 provides that the Justice Department shall conduct legal proceed-
ings necessary to "enforce" the named sections of the Rivers and Har-
bors Act.'3 7 An action qui tam is not literally an enforcement action,
540. The Court properly concluded that the forfeiture and double damages section cre-
ated a civil liability, remedial in nature, and that the section was separate and distinct
from the enforcement section providing for criminal sanctions. Id. at 549.
132. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943) citing Helver-
ing v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397-98 (1938).
133. See the authorities cited in Qui TAM ACTIONS, supra note 111, at 2-3.
134. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
135. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
136. QuI TAM ACTIONS, supra note 111, at 1.
137. 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
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but is a civil action by the informer to recover a portion of the penalty
set out in the statute under which the action is brought. At first blush,
therefore, section 17 would appear to deny the validity of a qui tam
action brought under the Refuse Act.
While the courts have denied qui tam actions under statutes with
similar or even more explicit provisions for rewards to informers than
those provided by section 16, there have been other provisions of the
applicable laws in those cases which clearly stated that the United
States was to have exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute the action.'2 8
The direction of section 17 that "it shall be the duty of the United
States Attorneys to vigorously prosecute all offenders . . ." stand-
ing alone might be considered such an explicit statement of exclu-
sive jurisdiction. But, the clause* does not stand alone; it is imme-
diately followed by "whenever requested to do so by [the Corps of
Engineers and other named officials]." Clearly the second clause
qualifies any exclusive jurisdiction granted in the first by limiting
it to situations where the Justice Department has received a request
from the specified officials. As previously indicated," 9 the clause
does not preclude enforcement actions by the Justice Department on its
own initiative; nor should it preclude qui tam actions by the public.
Qui tam actions should be proper under the Refuse Act.140 His-
torically, qui tam statutes were enacted to supplement the enforcement
activities of government officials who would not or could not act them-
selves.' 4 ' An analogous situation exists within the administration to-
day.142  Moreover, the courts have held qui tam actions proper un-
138. See the cases and discussion in Qui TAM ACTIONS, supra note 111, at 24-26.
139. See text accompanying notes 89-98 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 109-139 supra. Contra, Durning v. I.T.T.
Rayonier Inc., Civil No. 9070 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 6, 1970). In that case, the first brought
under the qui tam provisions of the Refuse Act, the court granted a motion to dismiss the
action. The court concluded, without citing any authority, that in enacting the Refuse
Act Congress did not intend to provide a means by which an informer could proceed
to recover the reward. The court was also concerned that if a qui tam action would
lie under the Refuse Act the United States and a private party could both bring an
action for the same violation. Again the court cited no authority and was apparently
unaware that a basic principle of qui tam is that the action belongs to he who first
brings it and that subsequent actions are precluded. United States v. Griswold, 26
F. Cas. 42, 44 (No. 15,266) (D. Ore. 1877); Miami Copper Co. v. State, 17 Ariz. 179i
149 P. 758 (1915). See text accompanying notes 129-32 and text following note
136 supra.
141. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
142. The administration has announced a policy of not enforcing the Refuse Act
in competition with the FWPCA. GUmELn-ms, supra note 70, at 1.1. Even if the
administration were inclined to enforce the Refuse Act, lack of manpower would se-
verely hamper its efforts. CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, CONSERVATION FOUNDATION
LETER Aug. 1970, at 2. This lack of manpower will certainly become even more of a
handicap to enforcement of the Refuse Act in light of the recent. Executive Order dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 54-56 supra. With 40,000 additional permit ap-
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der similar statutes. 143 Although these decisions do not form compel-
ling authority for allowing qui tam actions under the Refuse Act, they
do provide a basis for holding such actions valid. The criminal nature
of the statute should not preclude a civil action in the form of a qui
tam suit, and the provisions of section 17 do not appear to give ex-
clusive enforcement jurisdiction under the Refuse Act to the Justice
Department.
C. Effect of Enforcement Proceedings
Although a citizen may be authorized to bring a qui tam action
under the Refuse Act, the preferred method of enforcement is by the
Justice Department. 44 The Government's easy access to the courts
and the injunctive remedy available to it make federal enforcement the
more desirable alternative. Enforcement proceedings brought by the
Justice Department, either on its own volition or at the request of the
Corps of Engineers, have been effective deterrents to water polluters in
the past.
In the late 1950s, for example, the Corps' attention was alerted
to the fact that contractors filling sections of San Francisco Bay were
allowing logs and other refuse to float out into the bay. The Corps,
with the assistance of the Coast Guard, instituted an investigation and
requested several actions. In one of the actions, the federal district
court sentenced the violator to imprisonment. Although that action
was reversed on appeal, 145 the fines meted out in the other actions
provided the stimulus needed to induce the contractors to completely
abate their polluting operations.' 46
More recently, the Interior Department sought to control mercury
pollution through enforcement of the Refuse Act. On July 24, 1970,
the Justice Department authorized civil injunction proceedings against
10 firms accused of causing mercury pollution. 147 By September
11, 1970, four of the cases were either settled or scheduled for trial,
plications to consider, the Corps of Engineers will have even less manpower available to
check whether industrial dischargers comply with their permits' conditions.
143. E.g., Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Howard, 38 Il. 415 (1865).
144. Indeed, the result of the recent Executive Order requiring all industrial dis-
chargers to obtain permits under the Refuse Act (See text accompanying notes 54-56
supra.) may be to hamper the bringing of a qui tam action. If the discharger has no
permit, the citizen seeking a qui tam action would only need to show that there was
some discharge to prove that the discharger had violated the Refuse Act. If the
discharger has a permit from the Corps of Engineers, however, the citizen would have
to prove that the discharger had violated the provisions of the permit, a much more
difficult task.
145. Boblitt v. United States, 285 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1960).
146. Interview, supra note 47.
147. 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Developments 349 (1970).
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and the other six were in various preliminary stages. 148 -On Septem-
ber 16, 1970, the Interior Department announced that fifty indus-
trial plants discharging mercury had cut their discharges by 86 per-
cent.149 Murry Stein, Assistant Commissioner of the Federal Water
Quality Administration, directly credited the enforcement actions
brought under the Refuse Act with easing the mercury pollution prob-
lem.15 0
The preceding examples demonstrate the effect of Refuse Act
prosecutions on a class of polluters. The effect of threat of prosecu-
tion on the individual polluter, however, should not be minimized. In
United States v. Penn Central Co. 5' the defendant was fined $4,000
for violation of the Refuse Act and half was paid to the Hudson River
Fishermen's Association. In another case the defendant's own em-
ployee collected half the fine as a result of a prosecution instituted oil
the employee's information.'52
Fines; of -course, are only one aspect of Refuse Act prosecutions.
Of far greater significance to the water pollution problem is the type of
injunction issued in United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,' 3 in which
the defendant was ordered to cease its discharge of effluents into the
Calumet River. Ultimately, it will be injunctions of this nature, im-
posing a continuing duty on the defendant to abate the pollution, that
will lay the groundwork for restoration of the environment.
V. Conclusion
The Refuse Act is a viable weapon for enforcing water pollution
control. Judicial interpretation has expanded its scope to encompass
virtually all industrial discharges into any navigable body of water.
With the development of injunctive relief under the Refuse Act, the
Government is in a strong position both to prosecute recalcitrant pol-
luters and to persuade others to modify their activities. If the Govern-
ment chooses not to act against violators, the private citizen, perhaps,
may institute a qui tam action. Even if no action is brought under the
Refuse Act, the permit procedure allows the concerned citizen to make
his views known to the polluter and to the Corps of Engineers.
As I. Brecher has said, "It is almost impossible to believe that a
pollution control law as strict as the Refuse Act has been in existence
for more than seventy years in view of the vast increase in water pollu-
tion [in] this century."' 5 4  Considering the inadequacies of contem-
148. Id. at 509 (1970).
149. Id. at 550 (1970).
150. Id. at 600 (1970).
151. 69 CR 607 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1970).
152. United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. IMl. 1969).
153. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
154. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 7.21.
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porary legislation and traditional common law actions, the Refuse Act
provides one of the few existing means of achieving timely and effec-
tive water pollution control. It is ironic that this effective means of
control-a subject that has achieved unprecedented public attention and
legislative response-is embodied in an ancient statute that the govern-
ment has until very recently largely chosen to ignore.
Whether the President's recently announced requirement that dis-
chargers obtain Refuse Act permits'55 will mean that dischargers
legislative response-is embodied in an ancient statute that the Govern-
must clean up their effluents, or will merely rubberstamp the current
quality of the effluents, cannot be determined until the process of grant-
ing the permits is implemented. 5 " If the administration does require
dischargers to improve the quality of their effluents, the new policy could
prove to be the most effective single step in improving water quality in
the nation's history.
William C. Steffin*
155. See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
156. Under paragraph (d) (3) of the proposed regulations issued by the Corps of
Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency will determine whether the permit is
issued. Proposed Corps of Engineers Discharge Regulations, 35 Fed. Reg. 20,005
(1970). Although the proposed regulations provide many requirements for permittees,
paragraph (1) (2) indicates that Environmental Impact Statements may not be required
in many instances. Id. at 20,008. Some environmental organizations have expressed
concern that the new permit procedure might become a license to pollute due to the
difficulty of prosecution for violation. 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Developments 949
(1971).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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